Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978: A Questionable Expansion by Mohrman-Gillis, Marilyn
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 27 
Issue 4 Summer 1978 Article 6 
1978 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978: A 
Questionable Expansion 
Marilyn Mohrman-Gillis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Marilyn Mohrman-Gillis, Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978: A Questionable 
Expansion, 27 Cath. U. L. Rev. 767 (1978). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss4/6 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1978:
A QUESTIONABLE EXPANSION
In response to the problems of unemployment and premature forced re-
tirement of the older worker,' Congress in 1967 passed the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA) 2 to promote employment based on
ability rather than age and prohibit arbitrary age discrimination 3 against
persons between the ages of forty and sixty-four. 4 In the ten years since
the ADEA became law, however, social developments and judicial inter-
pretations have necessitated a second look at the legislation. The uncer-
tainty surrounding the abilities of older workers when the Act was
originally drafted5 has been reduced by gerontological research. Studies
have indicated that chronological age is a poor indicator of ability to per-
form a job.6 Also, the opportunity to continue working beyond the age of
sixty-five has become a question of economic survival,7 physical health,
1. See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2214 (message of President Johnson), [hereinafter cited as 1967
HOUSE REPORT]; Age Discrimination in Employment. Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills
Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Hearings]; Age Discrimination in
Employment.- Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Employment
Opportunities ofthe House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as 1967 House Hearings]; Note, Age Discrimination in Employment.- The Prob-
lem of the Older Worker, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383, 384-88 (1966).
2. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634 (1976)
(amended 1978)).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1976). See 1967 HouSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976) (amended 1978). The Act protects private and most public
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (1976). Protected government employees include those in
military departments, executive agencies, United States Postal Service and Postal Rate Com-
mission, the District of Columbia and the Library of Congress. See id.
5. See S. REP. No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 976 [hereinafter cited as 1977 SENATE REPORT].
6. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. The upper age limit was originally
selected because it was a customary retirement age at which many public and private pen-
sion benefits became payable-not for any scientific reason. See H.R. REP. No. 527, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 HouSE REPORT].
7. The inadequacy of income maintenance programs and the comparatively higher
percentage of older persons with annual incomes below the poverty level-14.6% of Ameri-
cans 65 and older are below poverty compared to 11.6% of the entire population-indicate a
need for older people to continue working. See 1977 SENATE REPORT supra note 5, at 3-4.
Catholic University Law Review
and psychological well-being for older Americans.8 In addition, questions
concerning the appropriate application of certain provisions of the Act
have divided courts and in some cases made the effectiveness of the Act
uncertain. 9 This has led Congress to conclude that the Act's provisions
must be clarified and expanded to meet the needs of workers over sixty-
five. Accordingly, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act Amendments of 197810 in order to "strengthen and broaden the
provisions of the ADEA to insure that older individuals who desire to
work will not be denied employment opportunities solely on the basis of
age."" This Note will examine the substantive and procedural changes
brought about by the 1978 Amendments and will evaluate their effective-
ness in remedying the Act's limitations and achieving its purpose.
I. PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
4. Substantive Amendments
The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or
labor union to discriminate on the basis of age with respect to hiring, dis-
charge, and wages, as well as in the terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment.' 2 The broad proscriptions of the Act are subject to three
exceptions: it is lawful (1) to discharge or refuse to hire an employee
"where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of the particular business, or where the differenti-
ation is based on reasonable factors other than age"; (2) to observe the
terms of a bona fide seniority system or pension plan "which is not a sub-
terfuge to evade the purposes of [the Act]"; or (3) to discharge or discipline
for good cause.' 3 While judicial interpretations of the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification and good cause provisions have been fairly straightfor-
ward, 14 the purpose and scope of section 4(f)(2), the bona fide employee
8. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 4; Hearings on S 1784 Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 166-183
(1977) (statement by Albert E. Gunn, Assistant Director for Hospitals, The University of
Texas System Cancer Center, M.D. Anderson Hospital, Hospital and Tumor Institute,
Houston Tex.) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Senate Hearings].
9. See notes 15-21 and accompanying text; notes 46-50 and accompanying text; and
notes 58-60 and accompanying text, infra.
10. Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Amendments].
I1. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 1.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)-(c) (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)-(e) (1976). The law applies to em-
ployers engaged in interstate commerce having 20 or more employees, employment agencies
serving such employees, and labor organizations with 25 or more members.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 623(o (1976) (amended 1978).
14. Each provision has been narrowly construed by the courts on a case by case basis
with an aim toward balancing the right of the employee to be free from age discrimination
against the right of the employer to determine reasonable business standards. Guided by
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benefit plan exception, remains unsettled. ' 5 Since pension plans often con-
tain mandatory retirement provisions,' 6 numerous courts have faced the
issue of whether mandatory retirement below the age of sixty-five pursuant
to a retirement, pension or insurance plan is allowed by the Act.
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann,' 7 the Supreme Court recently set-
tled a dispute in the lower courts by upholding mandatory retirement pro-
visions under the bona fide employee benefit plan exception.' 8 McMann,
a United Air Lines employee who was forced to retire at age sixty in com-
pliance with a company retirement plan, brought suit, alleging that the
involuntary retirement provision of the plan violated the Act. Adopting a
Department of Labor Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b)-(e) (1976) (regulations calling for
limited application and narrow construction of the bona fide occupational qualification ex-
ception), courts have sanctioned the occupational qualification defense in limited instances
where the safety and convenience of the public are at stake. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) (maxi-
mum hiring age of 35 for intercity bus drivers upheld wihen facts indicated that raising the
age would increase the risk of harm to passengers).
Courts have interpreted the differentiation on reasonable factors provision to merely re-
quire a good faith effort to make employment decisions on performance-related versus age-
related factors. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co., 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark.
1970) (termination of employees based on performance evaluations not discriminatory even
though nearly all terminated employees were over 40). See also 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(c)-(e)
(1976) (differentiation provision allows employers to disqualify employees on grounds other
than age).
Finally, to discharge or discipline for good cause, an employer must show the employee's
failure to satisfactorily fulfill his or her business responsibility. See, e.g., Surrisi v. Conwed
Corp., 510 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1975) (discharge based on employee's failure to increase sales
to the employer's satisfaction was for good cause).
See generally Note, Age Discrimination in Employment.- The Scope of Statutory Exceptions
to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 864 (1977).
15. Section 4(0(2) provides:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer. . . to observe the terms of a bona fide
seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pen-
sion, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this...
Act, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any
individual ...
ADEA § 4(f)(2) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1976) (amended 1978)).
16. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 9. The Committee cited a 1974 Bureau
of Labor Statistics study of pension plans finding that 41% of workers covered by private
pension plans were subject to mandatory retirement. Id.
17. 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
18. Compare Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1008 (1978) (pension plans with early retirement provisions are not prohibited under the Act
as long as they provide adequate benefits), with McMann v. United Air Lines Inc., 542 F.2d
217 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (pension plans with early retirement provi-
sions are prohibited unless they contain a non-arbitrary justification for the provision).
See generally, Doppelt & Takefman, The Retirement-Plan Exemption in the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967" Will the Exception Swallow the Rule?, 53 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 597 (1977); Comment, The Problem ofInvoluntary Retirement Before Age 65, 60 MARQ.
L. REV. 1053 (1977).
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discarded fifth circuit theory, 19 the majority found that any pension plan
initiated prior to the date of the Act qualifies under the exception whether
or not it contains early retirement provisions. 20 The Court reasoned that a
pre-Act plan could not have been adopted as a subterfuge to evade either
the Act or its purpose.21 Although the UnitedAir Lines majority based its
interpretation on the absence of "clear, unambiguous" statutory language
and congressional intent to undermine the bona fide retirement plans ex-
isting when the Act was passed,22 the dissent demonstrated that both the
language and legislative history could support another interpretation. Re-
lying on the House and Senate committee reports and statements made by
the bill's sponsors during congressional debate, the dissent suggested that
section 4(f)(2) was merely meant to allow employers to exclude newly-
hired older workers from the employee benefit plans.23 The legislative
history shows that Congress was concerned that requiring equal participa-
tion by newly hired workers in employee benefit plans would discourage
employment of older workers since, to be economically feasible, such plans
require a minimum number of years of service that would not always be
provided by the newly hired older worker.24 The practical effect of the
Supreme Court's decision in UnitedAir Lines will, however, be short lived
since the Court's interpretation is expressly rejected in one of the substan-
tive amendments to the ADEA.25
19. See Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
20. 434 U.S. at 203.
21. The Court rejected the circuit court's theory that a pre-Act plan could still violate
the Act's purposes, noting that since the Act is the vehicle by which its purposes are ex-
pressed, a subterfuge to evade one also evades the other. Id. at 197-198.
22. Id at 199. Language of the original administrative version would clearly have per-
mitted forced early retirement pursuant to a retirement plan. "It shall not be unlawful...
to separate involuntarily an employee under a retirement policy or system .... ." Id at
199 n.6. Statements made by Senator Javits in proposing the enacted version of § 4(0)(2), set
forth in note 15 supra, can be read to indicate congressional intent not to disrupt existing
retirement and pension plans. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 27-28. Secretary
of Labor Wirtz interpreted both the proposed and enacted versions to protect employee
benefit plans. Id at 53. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.110(a) (1969). Contra, DEPT. OF LABOR
ANN. REP. ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967 17 (stating the current
Labor Department position that pre-65 retirement plans are unlawful subject to limited ex-
ceptions).
23. 434 U.S. 192, 213-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The House and Senate reports ex-
plain the purpose and effect of § 4(0(2) as follows: "This exception serves to emphasize the
primary purpose of the bill-hiring of older workers-by permitting employment without
necessarily including such workers in employee benefit plans." 1967 HousE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 4; S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 SENATE
REPORT]. See 113 CONG. REC. 31255 (1967) (remarks by Sens. Javits & Yarborough).
24. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 27-28.
25. See H. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1000, 1001 [hereinafter cited as 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT].
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Under the 1978 Amendments, language added to section 4(f)(2) makes it
clear that mandatory retirement of an employee within the protected age
group pursuant to a bona fide employee benefit plan violates the Act.
26
Rejecting the Supreme Court's interpretation, the House-Senate confer-
ence report specifically stated that plan provisions in effect prior to the
date of enactment are not exempt because they antedate the Act.27 Com-
mittee reports of both houses emphasize that the amendment merely clari-
fies original congressional intent, as correctly construed by the newly hired
older employee's participation in pension, retirement, or insurance plans.
28
As a clarification, the amendment took effect immediately upon enact-
ment, prohibiting early mandatory retirement provisions in existing em-
ployee benefit plans subject to one exemption: early retirement provisions
in employee benefit plans and seniority systems which are contained in
collective bargaining agreements in effect on September 1, 1977 will be
sanctioned under the Act until the termination of the agreement or on Jan-
uary 1, 1980, whichever occurs first.29  This exemption recognizes that
early retirement provisions in existing collective bargaining agreements
were bargained for in good faith and it provides labor and management
with the opportunity to renegotiate contracts to comply with the Act.
30
In addition to clarifying section 4(f)(2), the 1978 Amendments enlarge
the coverage of the Act by raising the upper age limit for non-federal em-
ployees from sixty-five to seventy, effective January 1, 1979, and by re-
moving the age limit for federal employees, effective September 30, 1978.
31
The amendments retain the bona fide occupational exceptions without
change,32 but add broad exemptions which remove two groups from the
Act's coverage. Non-federal employees between the ages of sixty-five and
sixty-nine who served in a "bona fide executive" or "high policymaking"
position for at least two years before retirement and who are entitled to a
26. ADEA § 4(f)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2), as amended, includes the following language
after "individual": "and no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or
permit the involuntary retirement of any individual. . . [covered by the Act] because of the
age of such individual." 1978 Amendments, supra note 10, at § 2(a).
27. See 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 8.
28. See 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 7-8; see 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 9-10.
29. 1978 Amendments, supra note 10, at §§ 2(a) (b).
30. See 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 8.
31. See 1978 Amendments, supra note 10, at §§ 3(a), 3(b)(l), 3(b)(2), 5(a), amending,
29 U.S.C. §§ 628(b), 631 (1976). The 1978 Amendments also provide for studies by the
Secretary of Labor and the Civil Service Commission to determine the effect of raising and
removing the age limit respectively. Id. at §§ 5(g)(l)-(2), 6(a)(l)(A)-(C).
32. See 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 7. The conferees rejected a pro-
posed Senate amendment to clarify the bona fide occupational qualification exception, find-
ing that it neither added to nor changed the present law. Id
1978]
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pension of at least $27,000 may be mandatorily retired.33 The intent of
the conference committee is that only those persons who meet the retire-
ment income test and qualify as a bona fide executive or high policymak-
ing employee will be subject to mandatory retirement.34 The annual
retirement benefit, which may be from a pension, profit-sharing, savings or
deferred compensation plan, or any combination of such plans, must be
immediate, nonforfeitable, and equivalent to a straight life annuity.35 In
calculating the $27,000 figure, amounts attributable to Social Security, em-
ployee contributions and contributions of prior employees are excluded,
According to the Senate committee report, this provision is designed to
insure that the employee's retirement income reflects the level of retire-
ment income actually provided by the employer who compels retirement.36
An employee who qualifies as a bona fide executive under the Fair La-
bor Standards Act of 193837 and meets additional criteria specified by the
conferees qualifies as a bona fide executive under the amendment. To
satisfy these criteria, an employee must either head "a significant and sub-
stantial local or regional operation of a corporation" or possess compara-
ble or greater levels of responsibility than that of the regional level.38 Top
level executives who do not satisfy the bona fide executive test may never-
theless fall within the exemption if they meet the definition of a "high
policymaking" employee-one who has little or no line of authority, but
plays a significant role in the development and implementation of corpo-
rate policy. 39 As indicated by the Senate Committee report, this amend-
33. ADEA § 12(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 631, as amended, provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement of any
employee who has attained 65 years of age but not 70 years of age, and who, for
the 2-year period immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide execu-
tive or a high policymaking position, if such employee is entitled to an immediate
nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from a pension, profit-sharing, savings, or
deferred compensation plan, or any combination of such plans, of the employer of
such employee, which equals, in the aggregate, at least $27,000.
1978 Amendments, supra note 10, at § 3(a).
34. See 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 9. This requirement should pre-
vent low level managers, supervisors, or blue collar workers from being mandatorily retired
under the amendment.
35. 1978 Amendments, supra note 10, at § 3(a). See note 33 supra.
36. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8. The conferees raised the retirement
income test of the Senate amendment from $20,000 to $27,000 per year and rejected the
Senate provision for cost of living adjustments by the Secretary of Labor. 1978 CONFER-
ENCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 9.
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 216, 217 to 219 (1976).
38. As defined by 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (1977), a bona fide executive is one whose primary
duty consists of management.
39. See 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 9. Examples of greater levels of
responsibility include heads of major departments or divisions of a corporation, or, in a
large corporation, the immediate subordinates of the heads of divisions who also exercise
[Vol. 27:767
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ment was offered to reduce the possible impact of eliminating mandatory
retirement on the hiring and promoting of younger workers. Its purpose is
intended to permit employers to replace key workers in order to keep
channels of promotion open for younger employees. 40
For similar reasons, the 1978 Amendments also permit mandatory re-
tirement of tenured college and university faculty members between the
ages of sixty-five and sixty-nine.4' Unlike the bona fide executive exemp-
tion, this exemption expires automatically on July 1, 1982.42 According to
the Senate Committee Report, the amendment would facilitate the hiring
of younger professors, particularly women and minorities, and alleviate
the financial burden on already hard pressed institutions of having to re-
tain higher paid senior employees for the increased time mandated by the
Act.
4 3
The thrust of the substantive amendments taken as a whole appears to
be toward an expansion of the Act's coverage. While it is not clear to
what extent the bona fide executive and tenured faculty exemptions will
allow older workers who would otherwise be covered to be mandatorily
retired,44 the raising and elimination of the upper age limit and the prohi-
bition against mandatory early retirement provisions in employee benefit
plans seem to enlarge the Act's protection. This same thrust is evident in
the procedural amendments and clarifications.
B. Procedural Amendments
The ADEA provides for enforcement of its substantive provisions by
both governmental and private suits. 45 However, several procedural pre-
requisites must be met before a suit can be initiated. In a private cause of
action, an aggrieved employee must notify the Secretary of Labor of his
intention to sue sixty days before filing suit and within 180 days after the
alleged discriminatory act occurred.46 In a suit by the government, the
executive authority. Examples provided by the conferees include the chief economist or the
chief research scientist of a corporation. Id
40. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
41. 1978 Amendments, supra note 10, at § 3(a).
42. Id at § 3(b)(3).
43. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8-9. The committee also justified the
amendment by noting the difficulty of discharging tenured faculty for cause. Id at 9.
A Senate amendment exempting tenured elementary and secondary public school teach-
ers over 65 from the Act's coverage was rejected by the conference committee. Id See 1978
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 9.
44. See notes 95-97 and accompanying text, infra.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (c) (1976) (amended 1978). Under § 626(b), the ADEA incor-
porates by reference an enforcement scheme from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 211(b), 216(b)-(e), 217 (1976).
46. ADEA § 7(d), prior to amendment, provided in pertinent part:
1978]
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Secretary of Labor is directed by the Act to attempt to eliminate the al-
leged discriminatory practice through informal attempts at "conciliation,
conference and persuasion" before instituting an action.
47
Courts have been /divided over whether the 180-day notice48 and the
Secretary of Labor's compliance with the statutory directive of concilia-
tion4 9 are jurisdictional prerequisites to bringing suit. If they are deemed
jurisdictional, the plaintiffs failure to comply normally bars suit. In con-
trast, a non-jurisdictional interpretation allows the court to review the cir-
cumstances surrounding non-compliance and invoke equitable principles
to dismiss the statutory requirement and maintain the suit.50
The 1978 Amendments resolved conflicts in the circuit courts on both
issues in favor of the non-jurisdictional interpretation. To accomplish this
with the 180-day notification requirement, the Amendments retained the
provision but relabelled it a "charge" rather than a "notice of intent to
sue." 51 By this change in the language, the conferees intended to make it
No civil action may be commenced ... until the individual has given the Secre-
tary not less than sixty days notice [which] shall be filed ... within one hundred
and eighty days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.
29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976) (amended 1978).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). Compliance with this section requires investigation of
the alleged violation and attempted conciliation. Conciliation is satisfied upon notification
to the violator: (1) of what action constitutes compliance, (2) that back wages may be recov-
ered, (3) of the possibility of legal action, and (4) that the violator will be given an opportu-
nity to respond to the violations in light of the possible remedy. See Usery v. Sun Oil Co.
(Delaware), 423 F. Supp. 125, 128-29 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
48. Compare Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974) (juris-
dictional) with Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976) affd 434 U.S. 99 (1977)
(non-jurisdictional).
49. Compare Usery v. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware), 423 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (ju-
risdictional) and Dunlop v. Resource Sciences Corp., 410 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Okla. 1976)
(jurisdictional) with Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974) (non-
jurisdictional).
50. Since federal courts only have jurisdiction statutorily conferred upon them by Con-
gress, see 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.60, at 608 (2d ed. 1976), a jurisdictional pre-
requisite is an absolute requirement. If the conditions of jurisdiction are not met, the court
must dismiss the case. FED R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Generally, where a statute of limitations has run, an individual loses the right to invoke a
legal remedy. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177,
1185 (1950). Unlike the inability of parties or the court to remedy non-compliance with a
jurisdictional prerequisite, noncompliance with the statute of limitations can be waived by
the defendant's failure to raise it as a defense. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). Additionally, the
court can toll the statute of limitations or estop the defendant from invoking the statute
where equity requires. See generally Comment, Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 44 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 457, 459-60 (1977).
51. ADEA § 7(d), note 46 supra, is amended to read in pertinent part: "No civil action
may be commenced. . . until 60 days after a charge. . . has been filed with the Secretary.
Such a charge shall be filed..." (emphasis added). 1978 Amendments, supra note 10, at §
4(b).
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clear that the "charge" requirement is not a prerequisite to bringing suit,
thus allowing for equitable modifications for failure of timely notification.
The conferees further noted that the language is not intended to alter the
purpose of the notice requirement which is to allow timely notification of
defendants and afford the Secretary of Labor an opportunity to eliminate
the alleged unlawful practices.52
The Amendments apply the same non-jurisdictional approach to the
conciliation requirement.53 Prior to the legislation, employers had suc-
cessfully argued that the Secretary's non-compliance with the requirement
before the expiration of the Act's two year statute of limitations54 barred
the suit entirely.55 To avoid this result, the conferees amended the Act to
provide for the tolling of the statute of limitations during conciliation.56
The tolling begins when the Department of Labor informs the prospective
defendant(s) that it is prepared to commence conciliation, and continues
for one year. In the event that the statute still expires, the conferees made
it clear that the district courts have equitable discretion to stay any pend-
ing actions, thus permitting conciliation to be completed before the suit
continues. 57
A final jurisdictional question arises in determining the correct forum
for enforcement of age discrimination: federal courts enforcing the ADEA
or state courts enforcing similar state statutes. Two provisions of the
52. In relabelling the 180-day notification as a "charge," the conferees specifically re-
jected a Senate amendment that would have completely eliminated the requirement. See
1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 12. By retaining the provision, Congress
appears to have left open the possibility that a plaintiff could be barred from court where
tolling the 180-day charge is not justified by equitable considerations. Dartt v. Shell Oil
Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), aft'd, 434 U.S. 99 (1977), has been cited by the conferees
to support their non-jurisdictional interpretation; it offers some guidance as to when it is
appropriate for the court to invoke equitable modifications. The Supreme Court affirmed
the tenth circuit's reasoning that untimely notice of intent to file suit did not bar a plaintiff
from court because the purposes of the Act were fulfilled when she contacted a Labor De-
partment official who began conciliation and notified the employer 539 F.2d at 1261. It is
not clear, however, what other circumstances will merit equitable modifications.
53. See 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 13.
54. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1976) (2-year statute of limitations incorporated from the
Portal to Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 255, 259 (1976)).
55. See, e.g., Usery v. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware), 423 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Tex. 1976)
(when investigation of alleged discrimination is incomplete and 1 1/2-year delay is inexcus-
able, Secretary is barred from bringing suit).
56. ADEA § 7(e), 29 U.S.C. § 626(e), was amended by adding:
For the period during which the Secretary is attempting to effect voluntary compli-
ance with requirements of this Act through informal methods of conciliation, con-
ference, and persuasion pursuant to subsection (b), the statute of limitations . ..
shall be tolled, but in no event for a period in excess of one year.
1978 Amendments, supra note 10, at § 4(c)(1).
57. See 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 13.
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ADEA permit states to enforce their own age discrimination laws simulta-
neously with the federal government's enforcement of the Act. Under sec-
tion 14(a), if an action is filed under the ADEA, the federal action
supersedes any pending state action.58 Additionally, section 14(b) pro-
vides that "no suit may be brought under [the ADEA] before the expira-
tion of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State
law. . .."-9
The courts debated whether section 14(b) required an aggrieved individ-
ual to seek state remedies as a condition precedent to instituting a federal
suit.60 While section 14(b) was not amended by the 1978 law, the confer-
ence committee expressly adopted a non-jurisdictional interpretation
which was contained in the report accompanying the Senate amend-
ments.6 ' According to the Senate Report, an individual is free to proceed
in court under state or federal law; the section 14(b) sixty-day waiting pe-
riod applies only if the individual proceeds initially under state law and
files a concurrent suit in federal court.62
In consistently resolving this series of jurisdictional questions by adopt-
ing a less restrictive non-jurisdictional interpretation, these procedural
amendments and clarifications show a strong congressional intent to
refocus litigation from procedural matters to the merits of the case. While
it is clear that the procedural changes expand the Act's protection by facili-
tating access to the courts,63 the overall effect of the substantive amend-
58. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1976).
59. Id. at § 633(b) (1976).
60. Compare Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., Inc., 492 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1974) (dictum) and
Bonham v. Dresser Ind., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. Pa. 1976), modifiedon other grounds,
569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1978) (plaintiffs should be barred from federal court for failure to first
seek state remedies), with Smith v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 419 F. Supp. 770 (D.N.J. 1976)
and Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1353 (D.P.R. 1975) (aggrieved individ-
ual may pursue either state or federal remedies).
61. See 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25, at 12.
62. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
63. A final procedural amendment, while not related to access to the courts, assures
added protection once the litigant is in court. The amendment provides that in a private
action for "legal or equitable relief," there shall be a right to a jury trial if the action involves
monetary damages, whether or not equitable relief is also sought by a party in the same
action. 1978 Amendments, supra note 10, at § 4(a). See 1978 CONFERENCE REPORT,
supra note 25, at 13, 14. See also Note, The Right to a Jury Trial Under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment and Fair Labor Standards Act, 44 U. CHi. L. REV. 365 (1977).
For conflicts over procedural provisions not subject to the 1978 Amendments, compare
Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972) with Laugesen v.
Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975) (allocation of the burden of proof under the
ADEA). See generally Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 380, 388-99 (1976). See also Comment, Class Actions Under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act." The Question is Why Not?, 23 EMORY L.J. 831 (1974).
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ments, although apparently consistent with the procedural changes,
demands closer scrutiny.
II. 1978 AMENDMENTS-ILLUSORY EXPANSION?
On first impression, the substantive changes provided by the 1978
Amendments appear to expand the Act's coverage greatly. A more de-
tailed look at the legislative history surrounding the amendments, how-
ever, suggests that the actual broadening effect of these provisions may be
less apparent than at first blush.
A. Uncapping the Act
Industry groups criticizing the Amendments predicted that raising the
Act's coverage and restricting mandatory retirement would allow older
people to flood the work force, thereby reducing the opportunity for em-
ployment and promotion of younger workers, especially women and mi-
norities.64 In rebuttal to these largely unsupported fears, testimony before
the Senate and House committees indicated that only 150,000 to 200,000
older workers in the private sector, representing less than one-half of one
percent of the work force, would remain on their jobs if the ADEA age
limit were raised. 65 A similar minimal effect was projected for uncapping
the limit for federal employees 66 and for restricting mandatory retirement,
which previously kept workers between sixty and sixty-five out of the job
market.67
While industry groups argued that the Amendments would have damag-
ing effects on employers, older employees and society in general, 68 Con-
64. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 157, 414 (statement of Arthur C. Prine,
Jr., Chamber of Commerce); Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 Hearings on HR. 65 and HR. 115 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1977) (Statement of
Robert T. Thompson, Chamber of Commerce) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House Hearings].
65. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 78 (statement of Marc Rosenblum, Am.
Instit. for Research), 70 (statement of Donald Elisburg, Dep't of Labor), 97 (statement of
Michael D. Batten, Kirschner Assoc.). For response to fears about reduced employment for
younger workers, see id. at 329 (Labor Dep't report); 1977 House Hearings, supra note 64,
at 79 (statement of Rep. Claude Pepper).
66. See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 64, at 236 (statement of Joseph W. Lowell, Jr.,
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n). In 1976, 1,509 of 79,469 retirees, representing .06% of the total
federal work force, were mandatorily retired after age 70. Id. See also 1977 Senate
Hearings, supra note 8, at 185 (statement of Lauren Selden, NRTA-AARP) (A projected
2,000 of 2.3 million federal employees will remain on the job past 70 if the Act is uncapped.).
67. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 78 (statement of Marc Rosenblum) (An
estimated 60,000 workers would be protected under amended § 4(0(2)).
68. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 89-90 (statement of Marc Rosemblum),
37 (Special Comm. on Aging report); 1977 House Hearings, supra note 64, at 247-52 (state-
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gress was nevertheless persuaded by a large volume of testimony that
either rebutted these arguments or raised counter points that outweighed
business concerns. 69 While congressional reliance was not misplaced, and
the present expansion of the ADEA coverage is laudable, Congress can be
criticized for taking such a timid step in light of the overwhelming support
for expanding the Act's coverage70 and in view of public opinion opposing
mandatory retirement.71 Despite urging by interested groups and its own
members,72 Congress failed to eliminate mandatory retirement across the
board. The legislators justified retaining the ceiling in the private sector by
noting the lack of research on workers above the age of seventy. 73 By
uncapping the Act in the federal sector, Congress intended to allow the
Government to pave the way as the model employer and apply its lessons
to the private sector.74 This step may be unnecessary, however, since the
same information upon which Congress relied to support the present
amendments can arguably be applied to support uncapping the Act en-
tirely.
Although the estimates for the minimal increase in the private labor
force only reflect the impact of raising the age limit to seventy, the reasons
for the small increase between sixty-five and seventy apply with equal or
greater force to workers over seventy. Estimates were based on declining
labor participation rates for older workers and a trend toward early retire-
ment due to availability of pensions, access to early Social Security bene-
fits and the desire for leisure or second careers.75 These trends, which are
ment of 0. M. Sherman, Chairman, The Labor-Management Committee, The Business
Roundtable). See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
69. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 38-41 (Special Comm. on Aging report),
90-91 (statement of Marc Rosenblum), 320-21, 333-38 (Labor Dep't report). See generally
1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 354-61 (health and psychological effects of
mandatory retirement), 362-70 (productivity of older workers).
70. Groups supporting the prohibition of mandatory retirement include, among others,
the National Association of Retired Federal Employees, American Federation of Govern-
ment Employees (affiliate of AFL-CIO), National Association of Retired Persons/National
Retired Teachers Association, American Medical Association, and National Council of Se-
nior Citizens. See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 64, at 10; 1977 Senate Hearings, supra
note 8, at 176.
71. A recent Harris Poll indicates that 86% of Americans between the ages of 18 and 64
support the prohibition of mandatory retirement, and only 37% of hiring and firing decision
makers support a fixed retirement age. See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 64, at 17.
72. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 222-25 (statement of Lauren Selden,
NRTA-AARP); 1977 House Hearings, supra note 64, at 1 I (statement of Rep. Claude Pep-
per). Contra, 1977 House Hearings, supra note 64, at 22 (statement of Rep. William S.
Cohen).
73. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
74. See generally 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-12.
75. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 329-30, 342-43 (Labor Dep't report).
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expected to continue regardless of the amendments, 76 would proportion-
ally restrict any additional increase in the labor force that would result
from eliminating the age limit. The increases projected from uncapping
the Act in the federal sector lend further support to the argument that to-
tally uncapping the Act in the private sector will have the same diminutive
effect on the labor force. 7"
Industry representatives have opposed the Act's increase in the retire-
ment age ceiling on other grounds as well. Incapable older workers would
have to be fired rather than be allowed to retire with dignity on a fixed
schedule. Employers would be forced to make individual determinations
of fitness which are time consuming, less convenient and less equitable
than a fixed reference point by age. Since retirement would no longer be
certain, employers would also be hindered from predicting staffing
needs. 78 Counter arguments, relied on by Congress to raise the age limit
to seventy, apply equally toward eliminating the age limit entirely.
Chronological age alone has been found to be a poor indicator of perform-
ance ability. Further, mandatory retirement often causes financial hard-
ship for older persons and seriously threatens the health and emotional
well-being of those who want to remain active and productive through
work. 79 In raising the age to seventy, Congress determined that these in-
terests of older workers outweighed industry's inconvenience. Since Con-
gress is willing to force industry to fire for cause or develop standards of
fitness to remove employees before the age of seventy, 80 the additional
76. Id at 330. Contra, 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 414-15 (supplementary
statement of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
77. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 185 (statement of Lauren Selden).
78. See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 64, at 247-51 (statement of O.M. Sherman).
79. For studies indicating that chronological age and ability to perform are unrelated,
see Green, Age, Intelligence and Learning, 12 INDUS. GERONTOLOGY 29 (1972), citedin 1977
Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 358-59; McFarland, The Older Worker in Industry, HARV.
Bus. REV. 505 (1973), cited in 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 362-63; Maier & Kerr,
Capabilities of Middle-Aged and Older Workers, A Survey of Literature, 3(3) INDus. GERON-
TOLOGY 147 (1976), cited in 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 379-88.
The typical retiree's combined package of Social Security, pension and savings reduce
pre-retirement income by about one-half, which is further reduced by inflation. See 1977
Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 91 (statement of Marc Rosenblum), 180-81 (statement of
Albert E. Gunn).
According to the official judgment of the American Medical Association, "[t]he sudden
cessation of productive work and earning power of an individual, caused by compulsory
retirement, often leads to physical and emotional illness and premature death" often caused
"by loss of status, lack of meaningful activity, fear of becoming dependent, and by isolation"
that accompanies forced retirement. The AMA further states, "[t]hese losses could be re-
duced if older persons had more opportunities to remain productive." See id at 176-77
(statement of Albert E. Gunn).
80. See generally 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 85-86 (statement of Marc Ro-
senblum).
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burden of applying those same standards to the small percentage of work-
ers who voluntarily choose to work beyond seventy is certainly outweighed
by the burden on the individuals above that age who need to work for
financial or emotional reasons, and who under the present law may be
forced out of the job market. Thus, congressional reluctance to uncap the
Act is unwarranted when the effect on the labor force is arguably propor-
tional to the minimal impact of raising the age to seventy.
B. Pension Plan Compromise
Like the higher age limit, elimination of mandatory retirement appears
on the surface to have expanded the scope of the Act, but upon closer look,
this may be misleading. Although it closes a major loophole which previ-
ously allowed mandatory retirement, the bona fide pension plan exception
contains crucial legislative intent that may restrict additional rights of em-
ployees under the Act.8' In response to business concerns about the eco-
nomic effect of a higher retirement age on private pension plans, including
those protected under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ER-
ISA),82 the Social Security system and other employee benefit plans, Con-
gress adopted an interpretation of section 4(0(2) which insulates these
pension plans from the amendments. 83 The concerns stem from the fact
that these plans typically key payment of benefits to a "normal retirement
age." Depending on the terms of the plan, payment is usually set between
sixty and sixty-five. 84 In addition, annual benefits are calculated by fac-
toring in the number of years worked, age and salary, resulting in the ac-
crual of benefits at a higher rate during those years in which salaries are
higher.85 Thus, industry representatives were justifiably concerned that
raising the age or uncapping the Act would require restructured plans, in-
creased costs, more difficult estimates and perhaps termination. 86
In response to the Senate committee's questions concerning potential
conflicts between ERISA and the proposed amendments, the Department
of Labor stated that an employer would not be required to credit years of
service in accruing benefits after the normal retirement age, and that no
further accrual of benefits would be required if an employee worked be-
81. See 1978 Amendments, supra note 10, at 52(a).
82. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976). In general, ERISA provides disclosure require-
ments and standards for the establishment, operation and administration of employee bene-
fit plans designed to safeguard employees and their beneficiaries.
83. See 1977 Senate Report, supra note 5, at 13-16; notes 87-89 and accompanying text
infra.
84. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (1976).
85. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053, 1054 (1976).
86. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 159 (statement of Arthur C. Prine, Jr.).
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yond the normal age. The Department also maintained that the em-
ployer's failure to provide for accruing benefits would not constitute age
discrimination under the ADEA.87 The Labor Department justified this
interpretation by relying on the language of section 4(f)(2), sanctioning the
adherence to a bona fide pension plan which is not a subterfuge to evade
the Act, and by noting that this section "was intended to allow age to be
considered in funding a plan and in determining the level of benefits to be
paid. ' 88 Although this explanation expressly referred to plans under ER-
ISA, legislative history clearly indicates that it applies to all pension
plans.89
While section 4(0(2) gives the older worker the right to work beyond the
normal retirement age, the Labor Department's interpretation of this sec-
tion in effect removes the employee's right to receive equal pay for that
work. If employers exercise their rights to stop the accrual of benefits or
to refuse to credit years of service after the normal retirement age, those
working beyond that age will receive less compensation in terms of retire-
ment benefits than those who do not work beyond normal retirement. 90
In other words, the individual who choses to work beyond normal retire-
ment works at a discount because of lost pension benefits.
Contrary to industry fears, this interpretation will result in cost 'savings
to pension plans rather than in increases. The longer the employee re-
mains in the work force, the shorter the period during which retirement
payments will have to be made, thus lowering the funding assumptions of
the plan. Savings also stem from the added years of accumulated interest
while the uncollected benefits remain in the fund and the added years
gained by the employer without the cost of contributing to a retirement
plan.9'
87. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 14-16.
88. Id at 16.
89. See, e.g., 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 337 (Labor Dep't report asserting
that private pension plans need not provide for accrual of benefits after the normal retire-
ment age).
90. According to an official from the Department of Labor, under a typical "defined
benefit plan" with a normal retirement age of 60, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1976), an employee
who works for 30 years between the ages of 30 and 60 receives a pension of $7,200 a year
upon retirement. (Figure based on a beginning salary of $10,000 a year with no promotions
and a standard cost of living increase). In contrast, an employee with the same salary and
employment history who works between the ages of 40 and 70 receives a yearly pension of
only $3,240 if the employer exercises the right under the Act to stop accruing the employee's
benefits at the age of 60. If accrual of benefits continued until 70, the employee would
receive a pension of $9,860 for the same work. Interview with Michael McCarthey, Analyst,
Wage & Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor (May 30, 1978).
91. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 16. 1976 figures estimate that the
Amendments' impact on the Social Security system indicates a certain but relatively small
savings. See 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 337 (Labor Dep't report) ($644-$832
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It is clear from the legislative history that this interpretation played an
integral part in rebutting business concerns about existing pension plans
and in appeasing the opposition to the Amendments.92 Whether Congress
viewed this as a necessary compromise or an opportunity to determine the
impact of a straight equal pay interpretation on existing pension plans, it
clearly intended to retain the pension plan exemption. Although the ac-
tual effect of this interpretation is hard to predict, 93 the potential inequity
is glaring. In order to prohibit mandatory retirement under a bona fide
pension plan under section 4(f)(2), Congress may have compromised a ba-
sic prohibition of the Act under section 623(a): "It shall be unlawful for an
employer. . .[to] discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. .... -94
C Bona Fide Executive and Tenured Faculty Exemptions
Compared to both the substantive and procedural amendments, the po-
tential effects of the bona fide executive and tenured faculty exemptions
are difficult to predict, in large part due to the dearth of debate on the
provisions.95 In the case of the bona fide executive exemption, the nature
of the two-prong test involving income and job definition also adds to this
difficulty. As they stand in the conference report, the criteria for identify-
ing a "bona fide executive" or "high policymaking" employee are vague.
Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor could remedy this
condition and provide needed guidelines for interpretation. 96 In the in-
terim, however, the criteria potentially invite varied interpretations by em-
ployers and courts. Likewise, it is difficult to determine what salary level
will produce a pension of $27,000 because of the adjustments that must be
factored in.97 It may be sufficient to recognize that Congress has singled
million would be saved in decreased disbursements, and receipts would increase $232-$300
million, representing .4%).
92. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 13-16; 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note
8, at 415-19 (questions by the Senate committee to the Chamber of Commerce, using La-
bor's pension plan interpretation to rebut elements of their prior testimony).
93. Employers may voluntarily continue crediting years of service or accruing benefits
after the normal retirement age, or unions may negotiate for benefit accruals. See 1977
Senate Hearings, supra note 8, at 416 (supplementary statement of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976).
95. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 34.
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 628 (1976) (authority for the Secretary of Labor to issue regulations
and establish reasonable exemptions under the provisions).
97. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra. The president of Metropolitan Life
has estimated that executives with long service who earn $50,000 or more annually would be
eligible for retirement benefits of $27,000 a year. General Motors figures that only 12% -
15% of its top executives would have reached 65 and met the other criteria during the last 2
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out those employees between sixty-five and sixty-nine who hold significant
responsibility and will receive sizable pensions to receive no protection
under the Act.
By allowing a group to qualify for mandatory retirement on the basis of
income and job responsibility alone without requiring a determination of
vocational competence, this amendment on its face contradicts its stated
purpose-to broaden and strengthen the Act's coverage and further elimi-
nate arbitrary discrimination based on age.9 8 While the purpose of the ex-
emption, to keep promotional channels open for younger workers, must be
balanced against the purposes of the Act, there are alternatives to the ex-
emption which would achieve both ends. Existing management tech-
niques to avoid blocked lines of progression for executives include limiting
the years of service in any one position, rotating personnel between divi-
sions and offering increased benefits for early retirees. 99 Additionally,
employers are already free under the Act to fire for cause or develop per-
formance standards tests under section 4(0(3). In light of these alterna-
tives, Congress may have been ill-advised to respond totally to business
needs by removing this group from the Act's coverage.
Like the bona fide executive exemption, congressional response to con-
cerns of college and university administrators in the form of a temporary
tenured faculty exemption may also be too extreme. Although the diffi-
culty of firing tenured faculty for cause and the desire to create jobs for
younger professors are important considerations, critics of the provision
indicate that less drastic measures more in line with the purposes of the
Act were available. 1°°
III. CONCLUSION
Eleven years after the enactment of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, Congress passed long overdue amendments designed to
broaden the Act's coverage, combat arbitrary age discrimination in em-
ployment and resolve conflicting court interpretations which impeded the
Act's effectiveness. In the procedural realm, the 1978 Amendments
achieved this purpose. By adopting a non-jurisdictional interpretation for
each procedural requirement at issue, Congress facilitated access to the
courts. In contrast, the substantive amendments could restrict as much as
1/2 years. See Ross, Retirement At Seventy."A New Traumafor Management, FORTUNE
106, 112 (May 8, 1978).
98. See 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 1.
99. See id at 32-33 (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits).
100. Id at 33. Also statistics indicate that the need for the tenured professor exemption
may be lacking. Only .027% of the tenured faculty who are eligible work past age 65.
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broaden the Act's coverage. By raising the Act's age ceiling to seventy in
the private sector and uncapping the Act in the public sector, the legisla-
tors took a needed step toward eliminating age discrimination. In failing
to uncap the Act entirely, however, they exhibited a less than total commit-
ment to this cause. The purposes of the Amendments were further frus-
trated by the removal of two groups from the Act's coverage on the basis of
age and type of work without consideration of competency. Finally, the
Amendments closed a major loophole in the Act by restricting mandatory
retirement pursuant to bona fide pension plans. Although it enabled the
employee to work beyond the normal retirement age, Congress compro-
mised the employee's right to receive equal pay for that work.
Examined in their entirety, the 1978 Amendments fall short of their
stated purpose. Although legislators cannot be faulted for making conces-
sions when necessary to save legislation, the final outcome of the Amend-
ments suggests that political considerations may have prevailed over
congressional commitment to eliminate arbitrary age discrimination in
employment.
Marilyn Mohrman- Gillis
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